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According to an attractive and widely held view, all normative practical reasons can be 
explained in terms of value: 
 
The value-based theory of practical reasons (VBT): For all agents A, and all actions f 
that A can perform: A has a reason to f if, only if, and because f-ing has value.1 
 
VBT provides an informative and unified account of practical reasons, which seems suitable in 
at least a wide range of cases. Suppose, for example, that Ronnie, who likes dancing, has a 
reason to go to a party he has been invited to. A natural explanation of why Ronnie has a reason 
to go to the party is that going to the party will give him pleasure, and thus has instrumental 
value.2 Although one might well think that other things besides pleasure can be valuable, it is a 
natural and attractive hypothesis that all practical reasons could be explained in this general, 
unified way. 
 
1 Throughout this paper, I use the term ‘reason’ without qualification to refer to a normative reason, i.e. to a reason 
that counts in favour of a response, rather than a reason that explains or motivates such a response. I here do not 
assume that such reasons have to be possessed or epistemically available; they thus include what I have elsewhere 
called “potential reasons” (Kiesewetter 2017, 199–200). 
2 Schroeder (2007) famously uses this example to motivate a desire-based theory of reasons, but if we bracket out 
the ambitions to reduce the normative to the non-normative, a value-based explanation of Ronnie’s reason seems 
no less plausible (arguably more plausible) than a desire-based explanation. 
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VBT also harmonizes well with a widely shared view about intentional action, according 
to which intentional action always aims at some good (the so-called ‘guise of the good’ thesis).3 
For it seems plausible to think that acting intentionally involves acting for reasons, and that 
acting for reasons involves taking oneself to have a reason to act. Putting aside cases in which 
agents are mistaken about the nature of reasons, VBT suggests that taking oneself to have a 
reason to act involves taking the action to be good. Together, these assumptions entail that 
acting intentionally involves taking the action to be good, thereby explaining (a version of) the 
guise of the good thesis. 
VBT includes theories according to which a reason to f is always explained by the fact that 
f-ing promotes a valuable state of affairs. Such theories can be understood as claiming that 
reasons for action are always based on the instrumental value of the action. For example, Barry 
Maguire holds that “to be a reason for an option is to be a fact about that option’s promoting 
some state of affairs, on the condition that the state of affairs is valuable”.4 Similarly, Roger 
Crisp claims that “any ultimate reason for action must be grounded in well-being”5, and that “if 
some action is of no benefit, there can be no reason to perform it”6. But VBT also allows reasons 
to be based on the intrinsic value of an action, a value that an action might have in virtue of 
engaging with a final value in a way that does not amount to promoting it. For example, VBT 
allows a reason to go hiking with friends to be based on the intrinsic value of spending time 
with friends in this way. Joseph Raz embraces the view that “reason is … explained … by 
invoking value”.7 He claims that “reasons are facts in virtue of which … actions are good”8 and 
that “the only reason for any action is that the action, in itself or in its consequences, has good-
 
3 See Tenenbaum (2013) for an overview. 
4 Maguire (2016, 237). 
5 Crisp (2006, 37).  
6 Crisp (2006, 61). Portmore (2011, Ch. 3) also characterizes all reasons as reason to promote a desirable state of 
affairs. 
7 Raz (1999, 22). 
8 Raz (1999, 23). 
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making properties”9. On a natural interpretation of these statements, Raz maintains a version of 
VBT, albeit one in which the action may be intrinsically rather than instrumentally good.10 
VBT also includes theories according to which reasons for action can be based on agent-
relative value, which might in turn be understood in terms of agent-relative reasons for desires. 
Douglas Portmore’s claim that “S has a reason to perform [action] ai if and only if, and because, 
S has a reason to desire that [outcome] oi obtains”11 can be understood as a version of VBT that 
purports to accommodate deontological constraints and agent-relativity. VBT might also be 
formulated in terms of expected rather than actual value.12 Since the difference between these 
views is irrelevant for the purposes of this paper, I ignore expected value for the sake of 
simplicity. 
VBT is not only in itself an interesting theoretical hypothesis, it is also relevant for a 
number of other important philosophical questions. VBT is closely related to (and arguably 
entails) the claim (championed by G.E. Moore among others) that the right is determined by 
the good.13 Although it does not directly entail consequentialism, it is congenial to it, and it has 
been argued that VBT entails consequentialism when combined with plausible additional 
assumptions.14 Moreover, VBT has been presented as an important component of a more 
general Value-First Approach to normativity, which provides an alternative and a challenge to 
the popular Reasons-First Approach.15  
 
9 Raz (2001, 2). 
10 For another version of VBT that allows reasons to be based on the intrinsic value of actions, see Wedgwood 
(2009). Raz does not seem to claim – and he elsewhere denies (cf. Raz 2011, 27) – that the value of an action is 
sufficient for the existence of a reason. However, as I explain below, the arguments in this paper focus on the two 
other claims of VBT, which Raz seems to embrace, namely that value is necessary for a reason and that it is 
explanatorily more fundamental.   
11 Portmore (2011, 58). 
12 Compare Wedgwood (2017, Chs. 4–5). 
13 See Moore (1903, 146–48). This is so even if VBT is combined with an analysis of value in terms of reasons for 
evaluative attitudes. I take the view that reasons for action are determined by reasons for evaluative attitudes to be 
a version of the view that the right is determined by the good.  
14 Portmore (2011, Chs. 2-3). 
15 See esp. Maguire (2016) and Wedgwood (2017, Ch. 4). Many epistemic teleologists, such as Foley (1987) and 
Goldman (2001), seem to assume such a general Value-First approach as well. To say that VBT can be an important 
component of a Value-First Approach is not to say that it entails it or is entailed by it. Since VBT can be combined 
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On some views, VBT is underwritten by a conceptual or metaphysical analysis that reduces 
reasons to values. For example, Stephen Finlay holds that “the concept of a normative reason 
for an agent S to do A is that of an explanation why it would be good … for S to do A”.16 And 
Maguire’s version of VBT purports to provide “an analysis of what it is to be a reason”.17 As I 
have formulated VBT, the explanation of reasons that it postulates need not be a conceptual or 
constitutive explanation. But since VBT is entailed by a metaphysical or conceptual analysis, a 
rejection of VBT also entails a rejection of these reductive claims. 
In this paper, I argue that VBT is incompatible with plausible assumptions about the 
practical reasons that correspond to certain moral rights. One implication of the arguments 
presented in the next sections is that a Value-First Approach to normativity faces severe 
problems even in the domain where it seems initially most plausible. Typically, value-based 
approaches to normativity are criticized for being unable to account for non-practical 
normativity, most notably the normativity of epistemic reasons for belief and other so-called 
‘right kind’ of reasons for attitudes.18 In contrast, the arguments given in this paper attack the 
value-based approach at its home base – the domain of practical reasons. At the same time, 
however, these arguments are only effective against a direct value-based view, according to 
which practical reasons must be based on the value of the action favoured by the reason. It is 
consistent with the results of this paper to hold an indirect value-based view, according to which 
practical reasons are explained by some other value, such as the value of a rule, motivation, or 
sanction that is in some way related to the action. Indirect value-based views are beyond the 
 
with passing the buck from values to reasons for attitudes, it is compatible with the view that reasons are more 
fundamental than value. At the same time, a proponent of the Value-First Approach might reject VBT in favour 
of an indirect value-based view that bases reasons on the value of something other than the value of the action, or 
on attributive goodness rather than on goodness simpliciter (for two examples of such views, see Thomson [2008] 
and Gregory [2016]). 
16 Finlay (2019, 62, my emphasis). 
17 Maguire (2016, 237). 
18 See e.g. Berker (2013) and Way (2013). For the distinction between reasons of the right and reasons of the 
wrong kind, see Gertken and Kiesewetter (2017). 
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scope of this paper. So while the present paper presents a challenge for the Value-First 
Approach to normativity, it does not rule out all versions of it.  
One further note on my argumentative strategy. One way to attack VBT is to question that 
an option’s value is sufficient for there being reason to take that option. There can be valuable 
options that cannot be taken for a reason (such as, e.g., the option of going to a surprise party 
thrown in one’s honour)19, and if reasons must be capable of figuring as motivating 
considerations or premises of practical reasoning, then the value of an option does not guarantee 
the presence of a reason.20 While I have sympathies with this concern, I don’t think that it 
constitutes a principled obstacle to an explanation of reasons in terms of values. Proponents of 
a value-based view might concede that practical reasons are more complex than what is 
suggested by VBT and expand the explanans accordingly. There is a challenge of avoiding 
circularity, but without further argument, we should not assume that this challenge cannot be 
met21 – at least, this is not the argumentative strategy that I am pursuing. Instead, I will focus 
on two other implications of VBT: that the value of the option is necessary for the presence of 
a reason, and that the value of the option is always explanatorily more fundamental.  
In Sections 1 and 2, I will argue that promissory reasons – reasons to keep promises that 
are generated by promises – are not value-based. In Section 3, I provide a diagnosis and 
generalization of this point: reasons based on the exercise of a normative power are generally 
not value-based. Section 4 illustrates this with the example of reasons to obey. Subsequently, I 
discuss reasons to respect property (Section 5) and reasons to distribute goods equally (Section 
6), both of which are not based on the exercise of a normative power, and argue that they aren’t 
 
19 See Schroeder (2007, 33). 
20 See esp. Brunero (2013, §4) for this line of criticism. I argue against the existence of surprise-party reasons 
myself in Kiesewetter (2016, §3). 
21 Brunero suggests that this would be ad hoc: “There’s no reason for introducing these modifications, other than 
to save the view” (2013, 822). But I don’t see why it should not be a legitimate project to explore whether practical 
reasons could be explained in terms of value and some other notion, such as motivation or deliberation, unless 
such an explanation turns out to be circular.  
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value-based either. I address some general objections to my arguments in Section 7, before 
concluding in Section 8 by way of considering the theoretical options we are left with after 
rejecting VBT. 
 
1. Promissory reasons, first pass: the extensional argument 
It is widely agreed among moral philosophers that promises create moral obligations and thus 
moral reasons for actions. Drawing on Raz, I will call obligations and reasons that are generated 
by promises “promissory” obligations and reasons, and the principle that underwrites the 
generation of such obligations or reasons “the promising principle”: 
  
The promising principle: If A validly promises B to f, then A has an obligation, and thus 
a moral reason, to f.22 
 
My formulation of the promising principle reflects the fact that promissory obligations (like 
other moral obligations) are normative and thus involve reasons for action. Arguably, the notion 
of a moral obligation is more complex than that of a moral reason, because an obligation is a 
particularly stringent reason. Raz’s proposal is that obligations are reasons that are “protected” 
from being defeated by certain kinds of competing reasons.23 But the nature of this protection 
is controversial, and for my purposes it is sufficient to assume that obligations involve reasons. 
The relevant notion of obligation is, moreover, not the notion of an all-things-considered 
obligation. While obligations plausibly cannot be outweighed by just any kind of competing 
 
22 Raz’s “promising principle” is more general: “If a person communicates an intention to undertake by that very 
act of communication a certain obligation then he has that obligation” (Raz 1986, 173). As he makes clear, Raz 
takes his principle to entail that “we are obligated to perform action X, if we promised to perform X” (ibid.). 
23 See e.g. Raz (1979, 234–35). 
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reason, they can at least conflict with other obligations, and these other obligations may, on 
occasion, gain the upper hand.   
The promising principle figures (more or less explicitly) in many historical discussions of 
promises – including those of Hobbes, Kant and Ross – as well as contemporary accounts.24 It 
is intuitively appealing and seems implicit in the practice of promising itself. It is constitutive 
of the very speech act of promising that promisors communicate an intention to undertake an 
obligation to perform the promised action, and hence one cannot sincerely promise an action 
without believing that one thereby incurs an obligation to perform the promised action (at least 
putting aside uncertainty about whether the validity conditions are satisfied). As Raz puts it, “to 
say ‘I promised to f but I have no reason to f’ is paradoxical”.25 A vindicating account of the 
practice of promising will thus have to accommodate the promising principle. 
The restriction to valid promises is necessary because it seems plausible that promises are 
binding only under certain conditions. For example, it is often agreed that promises that are 
given under duress or false pretences are not valid. Perhaps (although this is more controversial) 
the same is true for promises to perform impermissible acts. What seems clear, however, is that 
the value of the promised act is not a condition of the validity of a promise: we can validly 
promise actions that are valueless. In an article discussing the relation between reasons and 
value, Jonathan Dancy presents an example of such a promise in order to put pressure on the 
idea that practical reasons necessarily correspond to valuable actions: 
 
 
24 For some examples, see Raz (1977; 2014); Shiffrin (2008); Pratt (2014); Bruno (2020). Owens (2012, Chs. 8-9) 
similarly holds that valid promises involve the undertaking of an obligation, but assumes that these are obligations 
we need not have any reason to perform. His assumptions commit him to rejecting a weak form of moral 
rationalism, according to which moral obligations entail at least pro tanto reasons for action. I agree with Portmore 
(2011, 38–51) that such a view cannot accommodate plausible connections between moral obligation and 
blameworthiness. 
25 Raz (1977, 212). 
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Suppose that I promise my children that I will tie my right shoelaces before my left 
shoelaces on alternate days of the week if they will do their homework without fuss. One 
can imagine arguing that though I ought to tie my right shoelaces before my left shoelaces 
today, since I did the opposite yesterday, my doing so has no value of any form.26 
 
This passage suggests the following extensional argument against VBT: Since one can validly 
promise valueless actions, and valid promises create reasons for action, there can be reasons for 
valueless actions. In response, proponents of VBT might challenge the assumption that 
promises for entirely valueless actions can meet the validity conditions of promises. On some 
accounts, promises are valid only if they have been accepted by the promisee, or even involve 
some sort of joint commitment to the promisor’s living up to the promise.27 This might be taken 
to suggest that promises can be valid only if the promisee wants it to be fulfilled or takes its 
fulfilment to be in her interest.28 Dancy’s children, for example, might take an interest in their 
father’s abiding by his promise, simply because they think this would be funny. 
But this response is unconvincing for two reasons. The first is that one can accept a promise 
without wanting it to be fulfilled or believing its fulfilment to be in one’s interest, for example 
if one accepts a promise out of politeness or in order to prove to someone the unreliableness of 
the promisor.29 The second is that promisees might accept a promise while falsely believing that 
its fulfilment is in their interest. In such cases, promisors can still sincerely promise an action, 
being fully aware that the promisee’s desire for fulfilment is based on false belief. To illustrate, 
suppose that my children want me to promise that I buy them a licorice stick they have seen in 
a store. I might be pressed to give that promise in order to avoid drama on the way to nursery 
 
26 Dancy (2000, 168). 
27 See esp. Gilbert (2014, Ch. 13) 
28 Ross seems to assume that a promise is binding only if “the promisee … wishes the promise to be fulfilled” 
(1939, 110). 
29 See e.g. Raz (1977, 213–14). 
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school, being aware that they actually don’t like licorice. After I have done that, my children 
are surely in the position to demand that I abide by my promise. I may regret my promise, or 
offer them a deal that involves their releasing me from my promise, but I cannot regard myself 
being released from the obligation to keep my promise on grounds of the fact that the fulfilment 
is not in fact in their interest.30 
A better response to the extensional argument is to concede that one can validly promise 
valueless actions, but maintain that by promising such actions one ensures that the action is no 
longer valueless. By promising to f one makes it the case that f-ing is an instance of promise-
keeping, and being an instance of promise-keeping, one might argue, is itself a respect in which 
an action can be good. Thus, by promising to f one makes it the case that f-ing is in at least 
one respect good. So even if one can validly promise valueless actions, it doesn’t follow that 
one can have reasons for valueless actions, since by promising such acts one ensures that they 
are valuable in at least one respect. 
At least initially, this seems to be a plausible response to the extensional argument against 
VBT. This argument is valid only if one assumes that promising does not itself make the 
promised action valuable, and proponents of VBT can escape it by assuming that promise-
keeping is as such valuable. In the next section, however, I will argue that this does not 
ultimately help the proponents of VBT. This is because on the only tenable way of defending 
the view that promise-keeping is valuable, this value cannot explain promissory reasons. 
 
2. Promissory reasons, second pass: the explanatory argument 
If acts of keeping promises are good, what makes them good? In many cases, keeping a promise 
is good in virtue of such properties as preserving or establishing trust, or meeting expectations 
 
30 Note that this doesn’t mean that my children’s interests couldn’t give me reasons for breaking my promise that 
outweigh my promissory obligation. This may well be so, but it doesn’t show that I don’t have a promissory 
obligation. 
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one has raised. But these are not necessary features of keeping a valid promise. A promisor may 
be so unworthy of trust that his promise does not raise expectations, and he might not be in the 
position to establish or preserve trust by keeping it, but the promise might still have been validly 
given.31 In order to counter the extensional argument, the defender of VBT must point to a 
necessary feature shared by all acts of keeping a valid promise that makes such acts good. 
Moreover, the keeping of invalid promises might on occasion also be good in virtue of 
meeting expectations or establishing trust. So the reasons that are explained by invoking these 
values do not seem to be promissory reasons, which are specifically generated only by valid 
promises. The defender of VBT needs to point not only to a necessary good-making feature of 
keeping valid promises, but to one that is specific to the keeping of valid promises in particular. 
I claim that the only necessary feature of keeping a valid promise that makes acts of 
promise-keeping good and that is specific to the keeping of valid promises is that keeping a 
valid promise discharges an obligation one has incurred by giving the promise. Firstly, in 
contrast to preserving trust, meeting expectations and the like, discharging an obligation is a 
necessary feature of keeping a valid promise. Secondly, it is a feature that is specific to the 
keeping of a valid promise. Thirdly, it is plausibly a good-making feature. We have reason to 
care whether we discharge our obligations, and it seems fitting to value performance of one’s 
duty. This seems to entail that discharging an obligation is a respect in which an action is good. 
Thus, discharging an obligation is a necessary feature of keeping valid promises that is specific 
to the keeping of valid promises and that makes such acts good. Fourthly, there does not seem 
to be any other such feature.  
While these points are consistent with VBT’s extensional implication, according to which 
there is reason to f iff f-ing has value, they pose a problem for its explanatory implication, 
 
31 See esp. Shiffrin (2008, 487–89) in response to Scanlon (1998, 311–14). The same point applies to explanations 
in terms of the value of the convention of promising: breaking a valid promise perhaps often but not necessarily 
subverts the practice of promising.  
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according to which there is reason to f because f-ing has value. To see this, consider the 
following explanatory argument against VBT: 
 
1. What makes keeping promises good is that doing so discharges a promissory obligation. 
2. For there to be a promissory obligation is in part for there to be a promissory reason. 
3. Therefore, promissory reasons are part of what makes keeping promises good (from 1 
and 2). 
4. Therefore, promissory reasons cannot be explained by the goodness of keeping 
promises (from 3). 
 
As the argument seems valid, the proponent of VBT needs to deny either the first or the second 
premise. Let me consider these options in turn, starting with premise (2). To deny this premise 
amounts to claiming that moral obligations are not constituted by moral reasons, but obtain 
independently of them. It might still be true that moral obligations entail reasons, because the 
fact that one is morally obliged to f might still be a reason to f. But on the view under 
consideration, this would be a substantial normative truth, comparable to the truth that the fact 
that an action is painful entails that there is a reason to avoid it. 
Speaking for myself, I have trouble understanding such a reason-independent notion of a 
moral obligation. This is not a concern with the notion of a reason-independent obligation as 
such. I have a grasp on what it means to have a reason-independent notion of a legal obligation, 
for example. One will take the notion of a legal obligation to be reason-independent if one 
thinks that legal obligations are positive, social facts. This is a respectable conception of legal 
obligations, and I have no objection to it. But moral obligations are not just positive, social 
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facts; they are intrinsically normative. And I don’t know what it would mean to say that moral 
obligations are intrinsically normative if not that they are constituted by reasons.32 
But there is also a further reason why rejecting premise (2) is not a satisfying response to 
the explanatory argument against VBT. For note that accepting premise (1) commits one to 
accepting that promissory obligations are part of what makes promise-keeping good, which 
means that promissory obligations cannot be explained in terms of the goodness of keeping 
promises. Thus, as long as one holds onto premise (1), denying premise (2) will rescue the 
value-based theory of reasons only at the cost of accepting that moral obligations are not value-
based. But this seems inconsistent with the broader aspirations of a value-first approach to 
practical normativity and the claim that the right is to be explained in terms of the good. At least 
those proponents of VBT who think of VBT as a component of a more general value-based 
outlook thus have to deny premise (1). 
So let’s consider the prospects of denying premise (1). Rejecting that premise amounts to 
the claim that there is a necessary feature of promise-keeping that makes acts of promise-
keeping good, but which is independent of the fact that keeping a valid promise discharges an 
obligation. But what would this feature be? All plausible candidates of good-making features 
of promise-keeping that do not presuppose promissory obligation are contingent features of 
promise keeping and not necessary ones, and they do not seem specific to the keeping of valid 
promises. 
Proponents of VBT might maintain that what makes acts of valid promise-keeping 
necessarily und uniquely good is simply the fact that they are acts of keeping a valid promise 
 
32 Note that saying this does not presuppose a reasons-first approach to normativity. It is consistent with reducing 
reasons to value, ought, or fittingness, and in particular with VBT. What is more, analysing obligations in terms 
of reasons is particularly attractive for proponents of VBT. For proponents of VBT usually have broader aspirations 
than merely giving an account of reasons; rather this account is thought to be a component of a more general 
theory that explains normativity, or at least practical normativity, in terms of value (or, for that matter, in terms of 
reasons for evaluative attitudes). As VBT explains practical reasons in terms of values, it seems more than natural 
for proponents of VBT to explain obligations in terms of practical reasons. 
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itself. But what is a valid promise other than a promise that satisfies the conditions for 
promissory obligation? On the most natural reading of this proposal, it entails my thesis that 
promise-keepings are good in virtue of discharging obligations. 
There is, however, another reading of this proposal, according to which the properties that 
make promise-keepings good are the non-normative properties upon which the property of 
being the keeping of a valid promise supervenes. Accordingly, the relevant good-making 
property is the property of being the keeping of a promise that satisfies conditions C, where C 
are the non-normative conditions that have to be met in order for a promise to be valid (such as 
the condition that the promise was not given under duress, or false pretences, etc.).  
A non-normative feature (such as being an action one has promised under conditions C) 
might be said to be good-making because (i) it makes the act obligatory, and (ii) the 
obligatoriness makes the action good. In such a case the non-normative feature would only be 
derivatively good-making, and the value in question would be the deontic value that consists in 
discharging an obligation.33 This would not help with the defense of VBT, for proponents of 
VBT have to insist that the favoured action is valuable independently of its being obligatory. 
Thus, for the reply to work, we need to assume that the non-normative feature is non-
derivatively good-making. The claim must be that being an action one has promised under C is 
a fundamental way of being good, just like being pleasurable, for example, or being a way of 
enjoying great art or spending time with friends. But this claim is just not plausible. While it 
seems natural to think that, for example, the value of pleasure cannot be explained in terms of 
a more fundamental value, the same cannot plausibly be said about the value of promise-
keeping. 
 
33 Throughout this paper, I use the term “deontic value” to refer to the value that something has in virtue of 
discharging an obligation. I realize that this is not the only way how this term may be used.  
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Moreover, there is an independent rationale for thinking that the value of keeping valid 
promises must be deontic value. For any view according to which promise-keeping is valuable 
faces the challenge of avoiding the paradoxical conclusion that we have reason to promote this 
value by promising actions that we will perform anyway, or that we would otherwise have no 
reason to perform.34 In my view, to say that the value of promise-keeping is deontic value offers 
an attractive response to this challenge, because it seems quite generally plausible that deontic 
value is not the kind of value that calls for promotion. This is a natural lesson to draw from the 
so-called paradox of deontology, according to which we can have conclusive reason to 
discharge an obligation even if doing so will lead to two other obligations (of the same kind) 
being violated. If the value of discharging obligations does not entail reasons to promote the 
discharging of obligations, if it calls for being respected or honoured rather than for being 
promoted, this paradox is dissolved.35 Consequently, the assumption that the value of keeping 
promises is deontic provides us with a good rationale for avoiding the conclusion that there are 
reasons for promising actions in order to promote the value of keeping promises. This is a strong 
abductive argument for the view that the value of promise-keeping is deontic value. 
 
3. Generalizing the lesson: normative powers and content-independence 
I have argued that promissory reasons are not value-based. In this section and the next, I argue 
that the lesson of promises generalizes in an important way. To do this, I first want to introduce 
the notion of a normative power, which has received considerable attention in recent 
 
34 See Smith (1997) and Smith and Black (2019) for this paradox. Smith and Black’s solution is to assume that 
while breaking a promise has negative value, keeping a promise has no positive value. In combination with VBT, 
their view entails that there are no reasons for keeping a promise – although there may be reasons against breaking 
it. Having to deny that there is any reason for keeping a promise strikes me as a high cost of adopting this solution 
on behalf of VBT. In addition, the view according to which there are reasons against breaking a promise but not 
for keeping them conflicts with plausible transmission principles about reasons, according to which we have reason 
for taking the necessary means  (cf. Kiesewetter 2015; 2018) or optimal means (cf. Kiesewetter and Gertken 2020)  
to conforming with final reasons.  
35 For the distinction between promoting and honouring a value, see esp. Pettit (1989) and McNaughton and 
Rawling (1992). 
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philosophical discussion. Following David Owens, I use the term ‘normative power’ to refer to 
the ability to change the normative situation by way of communicating the intention do so by 
means of this very communication (or by declaration, as we might say).36 One might exercise 
such a power in various ways, for example by permitting someone to enter one’s house, by 
transferring a property right by way of a contractual agreement, by issuing an order to a 
subordinate, or consenting to sex. The ability to promise is also a plausible example of a 
normative power. By promising one changes the normative situation (one creates an obligation), 
and it is natural to think of promising as a speech act by which one communicates the intention 
to undertake an obligation by means of this very speech act, for example by saying “I 
promise”.37 
It is a general feature of reasons (or obligations) that result from the exercise of a normative 
power that they are choice-dependent rather than content-dependent.38 The exact nature of this 
distinction is contentious, but roughly speaking, content-dependent reasons are explained 
directly by reference to properties of the reason’s content – the action supported by the reason 
– while choice-dependent reasons are explained by reference to the choice of a person who has 
the power to create that reason.39 This seems to be a suitable characterization of promissory 
reasons. A promissory reason to bake a cake, for example, is not explained directly by reference 
to the properties of baking a cake, but instead by reference to the choice of the promisor to make 
that promise. This is what distinguishes the promissory reason to bake the cake from all sorts 
of other reasons to bake a cake, which are content-dependent (that baking a cake is fun, that 
one will enjoy eating the cake, that it will comfort others, etc.). 
 
36 See Owens (2012, 4–5). See also Raz (1975, 103) for a related (but not equivalent) definition of normative 
powers. 
37 See e.g. Raz (1986, 173–76) and Owens (2012, Ch. 8). 
38 See Raz (1986, 35–37) who adopts the notion of a content-independent reason from Hart (1982, 254–55). Owens 
(2012, 3–6) distinguishes different grades of choice-dependence, the strongest of which is the one I have in mind.   
39 This is only a rough characterization because a reference to the choice of creating a reason to f involves a 
reference to f-ing and thus also to the content of the reason. The difference is that the reference to f-ing is mediated 
through the choice of the power-holder and thus indirect.  
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That promissory reasons are choice-dependent rather than content-dependent offers a 
natural diagnosis of why they are not value-based. For it seems plausible to think that quite 
generally, (i) the power to create reasons by choice may be used to create reasons for 
antecedently valueless action, and (ii) the only value that such actions could necessarily attain 
by way of being chosen by a normative power-holder is the deontic value of discharging the 
obligation that the power-holder has created. 
At the same time, this diagnosis suggests a generalization of the argument that promise-
based reasons are not value-based: Since all reasons that result from the exercise of a normative 
power are choice-dependent rather than content-dependent, no such reason is value-based. In 
the next section, I will illustrate and substantiate this point with the example of reasons to obey. 
 
4. Reasons to obey  
Consider the following principle: 
 
The authority principle: If A has legitimate authority over B, and A validly commands B 
to f, then B has an obligation, and thus a reason to f.40 
 
To illustrate, suppose that the captain on the ship gives the order that the sailors put on their 
rain gear. If the captain has the authority to make that order, and the order is valid, it follows 
that the sailors have a reason to put on their rain gear. We can bracket the question of under 
what conditions the captain has legitimate authority. We may assume (in accordance with 
consent theories of authority) that the sailors have all consented to being subjected to the 
captain’s authority. Or we may assume (in accordance with Raz’s “service conception” of 
authority) that the sailors are in general likely to better to comply with their (authority-
 
40 Compare Raz (1986, 60): “What is validly required by a legitimate authority is one’s duty”. 
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independent) reasons if they follow the captain’s orders rather than trying to figure out what 
their (authority-independent) reasons support and act on their judgement on the balance of these 
reasons.41 
The orders of a legitimate authority will create reasons for compliance only if the order is 
valid. For example, it seems plausible to think that even a captain with legitimate authority 
cannot validly command that the sailors commit suicide; such an act will fall out of the scope 
of his authority and the command will not be valid. However, as in the case of promising, it is 
important to see that the value of an action is not a condition for the validity of a command to 
perform that action. Suppose that the captain issues her order because she believes that it will 
rain. The captain’s belief may be false, and consequently, putting on the rain gear may not in 
fact serve any value. Nonetheless, the order is valid and the sailors have an obligation to follow 
it. If the value of the action were a condition of the reason to obey the command, then sailors 
first would have to judge the action valuable before accepting a reason to obey the command, 
and in many cases this would involve entering into substantial deliberation about the merits of 
the commanded action. But the whole point of authority is to pre-empt such deliberation and 
act instead on the basis of the command. As Raz puts it, “there is no point in having authorities 
unless their determinations are binding even if mistaken”.42 
This suggests again an extensional argument against VBT: Since legitimate authorities can 
validly command valueless actions, and valid commands entail reasons to obey, there can be 
reasons to perform valueless actions. As in the case of promises, proponents of VBT might 
reply that obedience to legitimate authorities is itself good, independently of whether the action 
had any good-making features before it was ordered. But what is necessarily good about 
obeying a legitimate authority? Nothing but the fact that doing so discharges an obligation to 
 
41 See Raz (1986, Ch. 3). 
42 Raz (1986, 47). 
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obey. But if the obligation to obey is part of what makes obedience good, then the goodness of 
obedience cannot explain the obligation to obey. And since obligations are constituted by 
reasons, the same is true for reasons to obey. So even if reasons to obey are co-extensional with 
a certain kind of value (the value of owed obedience), VBT fails for the reason that these reasons 
cannot be explained by this value. 
 
5. Reasons to respect property 
So far, I have given two examples of practical reasons that are not value-based – promissory 
reasons and reasons to obey – both of which are plausibly regarded as choice-dependent  reasons 
that result from the exercise of a normative power. In this section and the next, I will present 
two further counterexamples to VBT that are not examples of choice-dependent reasons. It 
follows that my argument cannot be rejected on grounds of skepticism about normative powers. 
This section discusses reasons to respect property, while the next one discusses reasons to 
distribute goods equally. 
Consider: 
 
The property principle: If X is A’s property, then A has a claim right against B that B refrain 
from using X without A’s consent, and B has a corresponding obligation, and thus a moral 
reason, to refrain from using X without A’s consent.43 
 
It is plausible to think that the property principle is part of the very meaning of the term 
‘property’. Part of what it means to own something as private property is to have a right to an 
 
43 One might wonder whether the relevant reason is, despite my announcement, choice-dependent, because it might 
seem to depend on the choice not to consent to the use. But the reason does not depend on the choice not to consent, 
but on the absence of consent, and consent might be absent without any choice. Even though property rights 
plausibly involve the normative power to permit the use of the owned object, the reason to refrain is not based on 
the exercise of a normative power. 
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exclusive use, and this means that others have an obligation to refrain from using it without the 
owner’s consent.44 
Now suppose that Aaron owns a bike. The property principle entails that Bruno has a reason 
to refrain from using this bike without Aaron’s consent. But whether or not Aaron owns a bike 
does not depend on whether there is independent value in Bruno’s refraining from using the 
bike, or disvalue in using it (i.e. value or disvalue that is independent of any presumed badness 
of using other people’s property itself). We might just stipulate that there is no such value or 
disvalue. This suggests an extensional argument against VBT: Since owning something entails 
that others have reason to refrain from using it, but one can own something even though there 
is no value in some other person’s refraining from using it, there can be reasons for valueless 
options. 
Proponents of VBT might agree that there is no independent value in refraining from using 
other people’s property, but hold that doing so is itself valuable. But the only thing that is 
necessarily good about refraining from using other people’s property is that doing so respects 
these people’s rights. So while the reason to refrain from using other people’s property can be 
said to correspond to a value, this value cannot explain the reason, because the value consists 
in respecting a right to an exclusive use, and thus presupposes an obligation, and hence a moral 
reason, to refrain from using the object in question. 
 
6. Reasons to distribute goods equally 
Consider, finally: 
 
 
44 Cf. Waldron (2004, §1). This is at least entailed by ‘bundle of rights’ conceptions of property. An alternative 
conception takes property to be a substantial relation between a person and an object. On this latter conception, 
the property principle ist still plausibly true as substantive normative truth rather than a conceptual truth. 
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The equality principle: If a number of persons each have a claim to a share of some divisible 
good, and none of them has a claim to a greater share than any other, then each has a claim 
to an equal share, and agents in charge of distribution have a reason to distribute the good 
equally.  
 
Suppose, for example, that Brandon and Christina spend the weekend picking apples and bring 
them to a juice-maker, who makes 100 bottles of apple juice out of the apples. Suppose that, 
for some reason, Brandon and Christina collect their shares of juice separately and the juice-
maker is in the position to choose between two distributions. She could either give each of them 
50 bottles, or she could give one 60 bottles and the other 40 bottles. The juice-makers knows 
that neither of them has invested more time or effort in collecting the apples and there is no 
other fact of the matter that grounds a claim to a greater share. In such a case, it seems 
compelling to think that the juice-maker has a moral reason to choose the equal distribution.   
If there is a reason to distribute equally, then VBT entails that distributing equally is good. 
But what value is promoted or instantiated by equal distribution? Appealing to the law of 
diminishing marginal utility, one might argue that the ten bottles in question have a greater 
benefit for a person who has 40 bottles than for a person with 50 bottles, and that for this reason 
equal distribution promotes welfare (in the sense of maximizing the sum of welfare that 
Brandon and Christina receive). But we can stipulate that this is not the case. It seems 
conceivable that Brandon and Christina get the same benefit from each bottle of juice, so that 
their overall welfare is not promoted by an equal distribution. That does not change the fact that 
they have a claim to an equal share and there is reason to distribute equally. 
It is also plausible to think that by and large, equal distribution of goods will promote 
valuable social relationships and work against power imbalances that can create a danger for 
valuable forms of societies. But this is not to say that such a value will be promoted in each 
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particular case. And it seems that if we assume that an unequal distribution of apple juice in this 
particular case will have no impact on social relationships and power balances, this does not 
change the fact that Brandon and Christina have a claim to an equal share.    
According to what Derek Parfit calls teleological egalitarianism, equality is intrinsically 
valuable.45 Drawing on this assumption, proponents of VBT might say that the value that is 
promoted by equal distribution is equality itself. But the view that equality is intrinsically 
valuable has forcefully been criticized. As Harry Frankfurt points out, equality is a purely 
formal property and it is difficult to see how such a property could be intrinsically valuable.46 
Arguably, caring for such a formal property as such, in abstraction from its relation to 
substantive goods like welfare, involves an objectionable form of fetishism. Moreover, as Parfit 
and others have argued, the assumption that we have reason to promote equality entails that we 
have reason to destroy substantive goods if this is what it takes to establish equality (the so-
called Levelling Down Objection).47 For example, if the juice-maker has the possibility to 
choose only between an unequal distribution of bottles (60:40), on the one hand, and destroying 
all bottles and leave both Brandon and Christina with nothing (0:0) on the other, then 
teleological egalitarianism entails that there is a solid value-based reason in favour of destroying 
all bottles. Of course, teleological egalitarians can also say that there are stronger, welfare-based 
reasons against destruction. Intuitively, however, we do not weigh a welfare-based reason 
against destruction against an equality-based reason for destruction in such situations. Unless 
further values are promoted by the destruction of some good, we assume that there is no reason 
to do that at all. 
If equality is not intrinsically valuable, and only contingently related to other goods such 
as welfare, why do we have reason to distribute equally even in cases where this does not 
 
45 See Parfit (1997, 204). 
46 See Frankfurt (1997). 
47 See Parfit (1997, 210–11). 
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promote welfare or other substantive values? According to deontological egalitarianism, 
unequal distribution is (under certain circumstances) unjust, or violates moral claim rights.48 If 
an equal distribution of goods is possible in cases like the apple-picking example, then the 
persons involved have a right to an equal share. If they have a right to an equal share, then 
others have an obligation not to deny them their equal share by choosing an unequal rather than 
an equal distribution, and this obligation involves a moral reason for equal distribution. But 
saying this does not entail that equality has intrinsic value, or that persons also have a right to 
the destruction of goods if equal distribution is not possible. It thus avoids the above-mentioned 
objections to teleological egalitarianism. 
In summary, it is plausible to think that the reason to distribute goods equally that figures 
in the equality principle is not based on presumed value of equality, nor on any other value that 
equal distribution typically promotes. Rather, this reason seems to be a constitutive part of the 
nexus between claims to an equal share and their corresponding obligations. If this is right, the 
equality principle suggests an extensional argument against VBT: since there can be claims to 
an equal share even if there is no value in equal distribution, and such claims entail reasons to 
distribute equally, there can be reasons for valueless actions.  
Proponents of VBT might reply that in cases in which the equality principle entails a reason 
to distribute equally, equal distribution is good in virtue of being fair. And indeed, this strikes 
me as a successful response to the extensional argument. But for an act to be fair is, at least in 
part, for it to satisfy a claim. And for someone to have a claim to a good is, at least in part, for 
others to have obligations and thus reasons to not deny her that good. So the reason to distribute 
equally is part of what makes equal distribution fair and, in this respect, good. Consequently, it 
cannot be explained by this goodness. So even if reasons for distributing goods equally are 
 
48 See Parfit (1997, §3) for an illuminating discussion of deontological egalitarianism and the differences between 
deontological and teleological egalitarianism. 
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always accompanied by a value, this value cannot explain these reasons. This constitutes 
another explanatory argument against VBT. 
 
7. Summary and objections 
I have presented four examples of practical reasons that seem to resist an explanation in terms 
of the value of actions. The first two examples – promissory reasons and reason to obey – are 
naturally understood as choice-dependent reasons that arise from the exercise of a normative 
power, but the other two examples– reasons to refrain from using other people’s property and 
reasons to distribute good equally – aren’t. Is there something that unites these cases? 
Arguably, all four examples involve reasons that correspond to moral claim rights. 
Promisees have a right to the promised action, owners have a right to an exclusive use, and 
under certain circumstances, we all have a right to an equal share. On at least some conceptions 
of authority, legitimate authorities have a right to obedience.49 As claims against others, these 
rights guarantee that others have obligations and thus reasons to act in ways that do not violate 
these rights. But these rights do not guarantee that the actions in question have any independent 
value, i.e. they do not guarantee that there is anything good about them other than the fact that 
they respect rights or satisfy a corresponding obligation. 
In what follows, I will address two general objections that one might raise against the 
arguments of this paper. I will start with the worry that these arguments are inconsistent with a 
widely shared theory of rights, according to which it is the function of a right to protect some 
interest of the right-holder (the so-called ‘interest theory’ of rights). If rights protect interests, 
it might seem that respecting a right must promote at least one interest of the right holder and 
thus be independently good in at least one respect. 
 
49 If authorities have no claim right to obedience, then the four examples may be less unified than suggested here. 
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The interest theory can be understood in different ways. On a strict interpretation, there can 
be a right to an action only if performance of that action is in the right-holder’s interest.50 As a 
result, there could be no right to a promised action, and no promissory obligation to perform 
that action, unless that action would be good for the promisee. But we have seen already above 
that this assumption is at odds with the common practice of promising, which does not 
recognize as a validity condition of promises that the promised action must be in the promisee’s 
interest. This also speaks against the strict interpretation of the interest theory. 
A more liberal version of the interest theory allows rights to be based on interests other 
than the interest in the object of the right. For example, Raz (who is arguably the most prominent 
proponent of the interest theory) allows that the right to the promised action is based on the 
“interest to have voluntary special bonds with other people” rather than the interest in the 
promised action.51 As long as the interest theory does not require that the interest on which 
rights are based must be the interest in the object of the right (or obligation), it is consistent 
with what I have argued. 
Analogous points apply to the other examples discussed above. A property right is naturally 
seen as protecting the interests of the owner, but it seems implausible to think that each 
particular instance of an (unauthorized) use of the relevant object must be against the owner’s 
interest. Similarly, a right to obedience may be grounded in some sort of interest, but it need 
not be an interest in each particular instance of obedience (nor need it in this case be an interest 
of the right-holder). Furthermore, people might have a right to an equal share even if they would 
not benefit from the relevant good. The interest protected by this right might be an interest to 
have a certain kind of normative control over the good (e.g. in having the standing to waive it, 
 
50 Compare Pettitt’s statement that rights “are claims the satisfaction of which are presumed to be in the interest of 
the bearer” (Pettit 1988, 45). 
51 Raz (1986, 175). He goes on: “It is is this general interest which explains why every promise, and not only those 
performance of which is to the specific advantage of the promisee, creates a right in the promisee” (Raz 1986, 
175–76). 
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or to donate it or give it someone as a present) rather than an interest in the good itself. In sum, 
it seems that the strict interpretation of the interest theory is implausible, and a more liberal 
interpretation is not in conflict with the findings of this paper.  
Let me turn to a second worry. The promising principle and the other principles I have 
appealed to are substantive normative principles that philosophers with consequentialist 
leanings often deny. Given the proximity between VBT and consequentialism, one might 
wonder whether appealing to such principles in an argument against VBT is question-begging. 
The principles I appeal to are intuitively plausible and part of common sense morality. That 
certain forms of consequentialism are inconsistent with these principles speaks as much against 
these forms of consequentialism as the arguments in this paper speak against VBT. Of course, 
it is always open to a defender of a theory to deny certain elements of common sense morality, 
and sometimes indeed common moral intuitions have to be revised in light of the fact that they 
do not withstand critical reflection. Ultimately, the rejection of VBT will therefore rely on a 
deeper defence of the elements of common sense morality that I have appealed to and on the 
tenability and plausibility of an alternative conception of reasons and normativity. At the same 
time, however, it should be clear that it is a significant cost for a theory that it is inconsistent 
with a number of plausible common sense judgements about moral reasons. If I have convinced 
you that VBT incurs these costs, I rest content with this conclusion. 
One might worry about the fact that I appeal to substantive normative judgements in order 
to defend the metaethical position that VBT is false. However, if it is legitimate to demand that 
a metaethical position be neutral on first-order normative questions, this speaks against VBT 
rather than my arguments. For it would follow that VBT can be correct only if it is compatible 
with my normative assumptions, while the arguments of this paper establish that this is not the 
case independently of whether these assumptions are true or false. So if a metaethical position 
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must be neutral on first-order normative questions, I can show without making normative 
assumptions that VBT is false because it rules out certain moral views. 
Having said all this, I should also note that a number of proponents of VBT are committed 
to preserving the principles of common sense morality I have appealed to. Portmore’s 
“commonsense consequentialism”, which involves a version of VBT, is designed to be capable 
of accommodating every first-order normative judgement of a non-consequentialist theory. A 
proponent of this view cannot escape the arguments of this paper by rejecting the substantive 
normative assumptions involved in the principles I have appealed to. Joseph Raz and Ralph 
Wedgwood both stress that allowing actions to be intrinsically valuable makes their views non-
consequentialist;52 and Raz in particular is a firm advocate of a number of the relevant 
normative premises of my arguments. 
 
7. Conclusion 
I have argued that a number of practical reasons resist an explanation in terms of value. Let me 
conclude by way of reflecting the theoretical options that this conclusion leaves us with. If not 
all practical reasons are value-based, then either (i) some practical reasons are value-based, 
while others aren’t, or (ii) no practical reason is value-based. According to the first of these 
views, practical reasons can have different explanations. Some of these explanations will refer 
to the value of the action, others will refer to the choices of people that have the power to create 
reasons by declaration, other reasons again might have other explanations or may be 
explanatorily fundamental. This does not necessarily mean that there is no unified explanation 
of practical reasons, but if there is such an explanation, it must incorporate value-based and 
other practical reasons as particular instances. For example, that there are value-based, power-
based and other reasons for action might be argued to follow from a more general conception 
 
52 See Raz (2001, 6); Wedgwood (2009, §5). 
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of reasons in terms of correct reasoning. In any case, it seems that the kind of explanation in 
terms of value that such a view would (in some cases) allow for cannot be a constitutive 
explanation that is underwritten by a claim to the effect that the reasons at issue are reducible 
to value. If not all practical reasons are explainable in terms of the value of the action, it cannot 
be part of what it is to be a reason for an action that the action is valuable. 
The second possibility is that no practical reason is value-based. How could this be 
plausible given what I have claimed in the beginning, namely that VBT captures well 
paradigmatic cases like Ronnie’s reason to go to the party? Perhaps VBT seems plausible in 
these cases because the reasons in such cases co-extend with an independent value (such as 
pleasure or welfare), even though the value of the action is in fact dispensable for the 
explanation of the reason. A defender of this view might say that what provides the reason and 
thus explains its existence are the intrinsic qualities of the pleasure that Ronnie takes in dancing, 
while the fact that this pleasure is also valuable is dispensable for the explanation of the reason. 
However, this view faces the challenge of explaining why the kind of reasons at issue line up 
with value in the way they do. It does not seem to be a coincidence that pleasure is both reason-
giving as well as good-making, and the view that hedonic or welfarist reasons are value-based 
provides an explanation for this correspondence. For this reason, there is pressure for the 
proponent of the thesis that no practical reason is value-based to instead come around to the 
opposite view that value is to be explained in terms of practical reasons (of the relevant sort). 
And the most plausible construal of such an explanation is presumably a constitutive one, 
according to which what it is for X to be valuable is for X to have properties that provide reasons 
(of the right kind) to promote or respect X. 
I am thus inclined to think that the conclusion of this paper will push one in either of two 
directions: a certain kind of pluralism about the explanation of reasons that includes 
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explanations in terms of values as one case among others, or a buckpassing view of value in 
terms of (a certain set of) practical reasons.53 
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